



Reasons are incommensurable when, and only when, they cannot
be compared as better, worse, or equally good.! Incommensurability
so conceived is relevant to choosing public policy because it is a bar-
rier to realizing the following ideal: In forming public policy, we
should select the policy supported by the best reasons. As an ideal,
this surely seems uncontroversial. Time constraints, lack of informa-
tion, and the vagaries of group political processes are, of course,
barriers to realizing this ideal, as is incommensurability. The latter,
however, is a significantly different barrier. When we encounter
incommensurable reasons in crucial areas of public policy, we cannot
do what we should do: Choose the option supported by the best
reasons. This problem is significantly different from the problems
posed by lack of time, lack of information, and the caprices of poli-
tics. The latter problems prevent us from realizing the ideal in prac-
tice; incommensurability prevents us from realizing the ideal in
practice or in principle because it is impossible in principle to com-
pare the relevant reasons. Does this mean that it is not generally true
that we should select the policy supported by the best reasons? Must
we, in cases of incommensurability, decide in some other way? Or,
t Associate Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I am indebted to
Stuart Deutsch, Sheldon Nahmod, Henry Perritt, Calvin Sharpe, and Richard Wright
for helpful comments on earlier drafts. I owe a special debt to Richard Wright for
years of discussion on this topic.
' CompareJoseph Raz: "A and B are incommensurate if it is neither true that one
is better than the other nor true that they are of equal value." JOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 322 (1986). Note that Raz defines incommensurability in
terms of values, not reasons. The two approaches are largely intertranslatable. See
infra text accompanying notes 12-14. Indeed, Raz is quite willing to describe reasons
as incommensurable. See RAZ, supra, at 338, 340 (explaining that the ability to choose
one option over another does not establish that the reason for the first choice is
commensurable with the reason for the alternative). Generally, discussions of in-
commensurability involve talk of reasons, values, options, lives, careers, choices, and
various other items as being incommensurable. For an overview of incommensurabil-
ity, see Ruth Chang, Introduction, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND
PRACTICAL REASON 1, 3 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997) [hereinafter INCOMMENSURABILITY].
We focus on reasons since our concern is with reasons for choosing public policy.
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should we find some way to eliminate or avoid the incommensurabili-
ties we encounter? These questions matter.
Matter to whom? We will not reject, modify, or defend any exist-
ing law. Our concern in resolving the dilemma is simply to advance a
certain description and understanding of our laws and of the proc-
esses that create them. Some may complain that if the investigation
neither recommends change nor defends the status quo, it is of inter-
est only to theoreticians and not to those whose primary concern is
the practical one of deciding what laws should in fact regulate our
actions. We might simply, and correctly, reply that theory matters.
More pointedly, however, we can reply that ignoring incommensur-
ability so profoundly misconceives the value and dignity of individuals
that the resulting conception of persons and their motivations is
better labeled a cartoon rather than a conception. To base our laws
on such a distorted caricature is to misunderstand ourselves, our laws,
and our relation to the state and to one another as citizens. If avoid-
ing such a misunderstanding is not "practical," then such a myopically
philistine "practicality" should not be our only concern in making
public policy..
This Article is a plea for attention to our collective identity as a
society in the making of public policy. For example, suppose that it
would greatly promote economic development to allow industrial
pollution that would deposit a small amount of lead in drinking
water. Assume that one consequence would be that one in every
thousand infants in a relatively small residential area would be men-
tally disabled. How should we decide? One natural reaction is to
marshal and compare the reasons to benefit economically against the
reasons to protect the health of infants. Attention to incommensur-
ability leads us to ask a different question: Do we wish our collective
identity as a society to be defined in part by our willingness to disable
infants for economic gain? Some will object immediately that the
comparative approach readily accommodates such a concern. Why is
a concern about collective identity not simply one more reason,
perhaps a very important reason, to be considered along with all the
other relevant reasons? An adequate understanding of incommen-
surability reveals why it is not, and why the point is important.
The key to understanding incommensurability and its conse-
quences lies in understanding certain features of individual rational
action. This may seem odd. Our primary concern is public deci-
sionmaking and public rationality, not individual rationality. To
dispel the air of oddity, consider law and economics. The descriptive
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claims and normative recommendations of law and economics de-
pend on a theory of individual rationality, the rational choice theory
of individuals as expected-utility maximizers. The same is true for the
descriptive and normative perspective incommensurability provides,
although the theory of individual action is decidedly different. In-
deed, the existence of incommensurability is inconsistent with the
claims of rational choice theory, and reflection on incommensurabil-
ity reveals the serious limitations of rational choice theory as a per-
spective from which to frame public policy.
2
I. POLITICAL LEGITIMACYAND THE COMPARISON OF REASONS
Before we turn to issues about individual action, we should con-
sider briefly why it seems so clear that we should strive to select the
policy supported by the best reasons. The short and obvious answer is
that proceeding in any other way would be irrational. A longer an-
swer-the answer we need-links rationality with political legitimacy.
That answer begins with the observation that, in a democracy, a gov-
ernmental decisionmaker "accepts the responsibility, among others,
to explain, particularly to those adversely affected, why different
treatment of others in other circumstances is not capricious or arbi-
trary or discriminatory. 3 In the making of public policy, there will
almost always be "those adversely affected," as public-policy decisions
typically impose costs on some and benefits on others. How does a
decisionmaker show that the treatment is not "capricious or arbitrary
or discriminatory"? Surely by articulating the reasons for the policy,
and-especially to address the concerns of the adversely affected-
explaining why those reasons are better than the reasons for compet-
ing policies that would have allocated costs and benefits differently.
Articulating the reasons for policy decisions is a requirement of
political legitimacy. As Steven Burton emphasizes, "[i]n a society that
cares about justice .... decision making based on reason .... not
preference or faith, is crucial for legitimacy. " 4 The ideal of legitimacy
2 I discuss rational choice theory and its incompatibility with incommensurability
in Richard Warner, Impossible Comparisons and Rational Choice Theory, 68 S. CAL L. REV.
1705 (1995).
3 Ronald Dworkin, Pragmatism, Right Answers, and True Banality, in PRAGMATISM IN
LAW AND SOcIETY 359, 373-74 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991). Dworkin
is talking about courts, but the remark applies equally to nonjudicial public decision-
makers.
4 Steven J. Burton, Reaffirming Legal Reasoning. The Challenge from the Le, 36 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 358, 368 (1986).
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is the ideal of a government that commands compliance with its
dictates, not through the threat of force, but because citizens, insofar
as they are rational, see themselves as having adequate reasons to
comply." Consequently, governmental decisionmakers undermine
their legitimacy when they fail to base policy on a comparison of
reasons. To undermine, however, is not necessarily to destroy. We
may have reasons to obey particular commands that we regard as
irrational, for we may in general regard the state as conducting itself
in a way that enlists our rational assent to almost all of its commands.
On the other hand, too many ill-reasoned decisions and policies will
destroy legitimacy by ensuring that we will fail to have, and to see
ourselves as having, adequate reason to comply.
An example illustrates the link between legitimacy and public de-
cisionmaking based on comparing reasons:
Due to budgetary restrictions, a town must decide whether to cut fund-
ing for the schools, the fire department, or the police department, al-
though needs for all three services are urgent and increasing. While in
some circumstances the rankings might be fairly easy to make, it is
equally easy to imagine circumstances in which individuals might find it
difficult or impossible to make them, for instance when the town's de-
sire to fund each service is supported by weighty, but very different rea-
6
sons.
Richard Pildes and Elizabeth Anderson offer this example in their
critique of social-choice theory when they claim that the "very differ-
ent" reasons are incommensurable ("the rankings [are] ... impossi-
ble to make") . Suppose, arguendo, that this is true, and to simplify,
drop the fire department, and suppose that the choice is a binary one
between cutting funding for the schools or cutting funding for the
police. Imagine that the town council decides to fund the police.
How will it justify its decision to the proponents of funding the
schools? It can, of course, cite the reasons it has for funding the
police, but what will it say when the proponents of the schools ask why
- The reasons in question are reasons other than the merely prudential reason of
avoiding punishment by the state.
6 Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social
Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2160
(1990).
Pildes and Anderson actually say that "individuals might find it difficult or
impossible to make" the rankings. Id. This is a slip. Mere difficulty is insufficient to
show impossibility-even if the difficulty is so great that we could characterize it as
practically impossible to make the comparison. Impossibility of comparison is not a
matter of comparison being difficult; it is a matter of it being impossible.
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those reasons are better than the reasons for school funding? If the
reasons cannot be compared, the council cannot answer this ques-
tion. But surely the proponents of funding the schools are entitled to
an answer. How else is the town council to meet the demand of
democratic legitimacy that it explain why its decision is not
"capricious or arbitrary or discriminatory"?
A qualification: The town council need not provide the explana-
tion. It would be extremely unrealistic to insist that every public
decisionmaker respond to demands for explanations from every
person adversely affected by a decision. The requirement is that a
rational, sufficiently informed, and intelligent citizen should, in
principle, possess or be able to construct an adequate explanation.
Political leaders, political parties, and general political discourse
should, but lamentably do not, play leading roles in ensuring that
citizens sufficiently closely approximate such an ideally rational,
informed, and intelligent citizen. Having noted that the decision-
maker need not provide an explanation, we will, for expositional
convenience, talk as if the decisionmaker does, and should, provide
the explanation.
Assuming public decisionmakers ideally should select policy
based on the best reasons, how should such decisionmakers respond
to incommensurability? Of course, there is nothing to worry about if
incommensurability does not exist. Does it?
II. DOES INCOMMENSURABILrIYEXIST?
Different theorists mean different things by incommensurability.
We will focus on-to use Joseph Raz's term-"constituive incommen-
surability."8 Constitutive incommensurabilities arise when "[bleing
engaged in a pursuit or a relationship includes belief that certain
options are not comparable in value."9 The point is that the "pursuit
or relationship"10 is in part defined by the belief; without the belief,
one does not count as involved in that pursuit or relationship. Raz
offers friendship as an example: "Only those who hold the view that
friendship is neither better nor worse than money, but is simply not
comparable to money or other commodities are capable of having
friends."" An initial difficulty here is that Raz explains constitutive
8 See RAZ, supra note 1, at 345-53.
9 ik at 356.
10 Id. at 355.
" Id at 352.
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incommensurability in terms of the incomparability of values, not
reasons.12 In general, the incommensurability literature identifies a
wide array of items as capable of incommensurability: options, goods,
actions, and life plans, for example, as well as 
values and reasons. 1
We have focused on reasons because our concern is with reasons for
choosing public policy. One, however, easily may translate Raz's talk
of values into talk of reasons.
In this context, "value" has the sense it does when, for example, I
say, "I value my daughter's playfulness." To say this is to express a
certain attitude toward her playfulness, an attitude that typically finds
expression in thoughts, feelings, and actions. Valuing as an attitude
is intimately related to having reasons for action. Suppose, for exam-
ple, I value philosophical discussion. I value it in the sense that I
offer participating in philosophical discussion as a reason to, for
example, participate in this Symposium; moreover, I offer it as a
reason that is final, as a reason that needs no further justificatory or
explanatory backing by any other reason. Thus, suppose you were to
ask, "Why participate in philosophical discussion?" I would answer,
"For its own sake." I do not engage in the activity simply as a means
to an end; rather, I regard it as an end in itself.'
4 Valuing-in one
good sense of the term-is simply regarding some experience, activ-
ity, or item as a source of final reasons. One also, of course, can value
something derivatively as a means to something one values for its own
sake. In such a case, one sees oneself as having a reason to realize the
derivatively valued item as a means to realizing what one values for its
own sake.
Expressed in terms of reasons, Raz's claim about friendship be-
comes the claim that friendship is defined in part, for example, by the
belief that, when presented with the opportunity to gain $1,000,000
by betraying one's friend, one cannot, insofar as one is really a friend,
decide whether to betray by comparing the reasons to take the money
to the reasons to remain loyal. Friendship is constituted in part by
not conditioning its continued existence on the outcome of such
12 For Raz's general account of incommensurability in terms of value, see supra
note 1.
13 Seesupra note 1 (identifying other items as capable of incommensurability).
14 A "means" need not be a causal means. Looking at the Czanne landscapes
results in-in the sense of "realizes," not in the sense of "causally produces"-looking
at impressionist landscapes, since that is what the C~zannes are. I draw some relevant
distinctions in RIcHARD WARNER, FREEDOM, ENJOYMENT, AND HAPPINESS 143M5
(1987).
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calculations. Such is the claim. Is it true? More generally, are there
pursuits and relationships defined in this way? The key to seeing that
the answer is "yes" is to distinguish two senses of "reason."
A. Two Senses of "Reason"
To illustrate the first sense of "reason," suppose I devote consid-
erable time to chess. When asked why, I explain that a well-played
game displays the beauty of forces in dynamic tension; the game
reveals the creativity, courage, and practical judgment of the players
in an exercise of intuition and calculation akin to both mathematics
and art. These considerations are my reasons for playing chess. They
are reasons in the sense that they play a certain justificatory-
motivational role. So, for example, if asked why I devote time to
chess, I would (other things being equal) cite the above considera-
tions as my justification. The same considerations motivate me to
play chess, study chess, go to the chess book sections of bookstores,
and so on.15
,- There is an important relationship in the case of reasons between justification
and motivation: When a consideration is a reason for action, then typically a person
is, or should be, motivated to act because the person thinks that the consideration
justifies the action. This "because" covers many significantly different cases, but the
differences do not matter here. A full philosophical treatment of incommensurability
would explore these issues in detail, as well as issues related to the "or should be" in "a
person is (or should be) motivated to act because ...."
To see the point of the "or should be," consider Mason. Mason is a gourmet who
works as a restaurant reviewer for newspapers and magazines. His doctor tells him he
has gout and must, on pain of destroying his health, stop eating the rich French food
in which he delights. But Mason persists in his gourmet pursuits; he thinks of himself
as a badly injured warrior who, although doomed to defeat, defiantly refuses to cease
fighting for his ideal-the ideal for the gourmet Mason being the refinement of
appetite as a source of pleasure. He does not deny that the health considerations
justify ceasing his gourmet activities; however, no matter how much he reflects on
those justificatory considerations, they fail to motivate him to curtail his gourmet
delights. Mason's dismayed friends try to argue him out of his destructive course.
They think that the justificatory considerations should motivate Mason. In reflecting
on such cases, it is helpful to note what Finnis calls "a fundamental ambiguity" in the
concept of a reason:
"Reasons," "choices" and "action" are words afflicted with a fundamental
ambiguity. Its principal source is that we are animals, but intelligent. All our
actions have an emotional motivation, involve our feelings and imagination
and other aspects of our bodiliness .... But rationally motivated actions also
have an intelligent motivation, and seek to realize (protect, promote) an in-
telligible good. So our purposes, the states of affairs which we seek to bring
about, have a double aspect: the goal which we imagine and which engages
our feelings, and the intelligible benefit which appeals to our rationality by
promising to instantiate.., some basic human good. The word"reason" is of-
12931998]
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To illustrate the second sense of "reason," compare me as a chess
player to Jones, for whom the considerations noted above do not play
a reason's justificatory-motivational role. There are a variety of possi-
ble explanations for this. Devoting himself to chess might be a possi-
bility that Jones closed off earlier in life. He might have decided
explicitly one day to devote his time and energy to other pursuits, or
commitments might have gradually grown and developed in ways that
left no time or energy for chess, orJones simply might never have had
any interest in chess at all. Whatever the scenario, the result is that
the considerations do not play the relevant justificatory-motivational
role. The considerations are confined for him to the role of making
the actions of others intelligible. Jones still can acknowledge that the
considerations constitute a reason, in the sense that, for others, they
play a reason'sjustificatory-motivational role.
B. An Example
Now, how does this distinction between senses of "reason" help
explain constitutive incommensurability? An example is helpful.
Suppose Jones and I are revolutionaries. An official in the govern-
ment we oppose offers me $1,000,000 to reveal names, hiding places,
and plans of my fellow revolutionaries. I refuse. The official then
makes the same offer to Jones, who also refuses. His refusal is based
on a comparison of reasons. Jones would use the money to buy a
yacht that he would sail around the world, and, in light of this ambi-
tion, he regards the money as a potential reason to betray the revolu-
tion. However, he also regards his loyalty as providing a reason not to
betray the revolution. On reflection, he finds the loyalty-provided
reason not to betray to be better than the money-provided reason to
betray. However, as Jones cheerfully acknowledges, had the price
been higher-say $10,000,000-the result would have been different,
and he would have betrayed the revolution without hesitation.
I might be thought to be relevantly like Jones. Indeed, suppose I
share Jones's circumnavigational fantasy, and that I, too, would use
ten used loosely to refer to one's purposes, without distinguishing between a
purpose motivated ultimately by nothing more than feeling and a purpose
motivated by one's understanding of a basic human good. I shall be using the
word "reason".. . to refer only to reason in the latter sense.
John Finnis, NaturalLaw and Legal Reasoning, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 1 (1990). Mason's
friends think that thejustificatory considerations about health should motivate Mason
because such a motivation would lead Mason to instantiate the basic human good of
health.
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the money to buy a yacht and sail around the world. Do I not have a
reason to betray the revolution in order to get the money? But since I
refuse the bribe, doesn't this mean that I must take my loyalty-
provided reason not to betray to be better than the money-provided
reason to do so? No. I do not refuse as a result of comparing rea-
sons. I refuse precisely because I do not 'compare. I regard myself as
having a loyalty-provided reason not to betray the revolution, and no
money-provided reason-at least, no such reason that I will con-
sider-to betray the revolution. I treat the offer of the money as if it
provided no reason whatsoever to betray the revolution; I exclude it
entirely from my deliberations. I refuse the bribe because I have a
reason to do so, and no competing reason-no competing reason
that I will consider-weighing the other way. I adopt this stance
because it is constitutive of, definitive of, what I mean by loyalty that
the money-provided considerations do not play the justificatory-
motivational role of a reason for me.
Let us call such commitments "reason-excluding." How are such
commitments possible? Here is one way: My commitment to the
revolution guarantees that the financial considerations are motiva-
tionally completely inert-they cannot motivate me at all to betray.
In short, if the considerations do not motivate, they necessarily can-
not play the justificatory-motivational role of a reason. The closing
off of this motivational possibility is no accident; rather, it is definitive
of the way in which I value the revolution. If the financial considera-
tions inclined me to betray it, I would not be loyal to the cause in the
way I am. Of course, I might be motivated-if I were drugged, inca-
pacitated, confused, or in some other way disordered. The point is
that when my commitment is at full force and my capacity to under-
stand it and conform my thought and action to it is undiminished,
then I cannot be motivated to betray the revolution in order to gain
money.
It is essential to note that commitments, however, do not have to
render considerations motivationally inert to ensure that those con-
siderations fail to play the justificatory-motivational role of a reason.
Recall what it is to play that role. It is not enough that a person
merely acknowledges the justificatory force of a consideration. Jones
does that when he acknowledges the justificatory force of the consid-
erations I advance to account for my chess playing. Considerations
play the relevant role only when a person actually uses (or would in
appropriate circumstances use) those considerations to justify his or
her own actions. This is what Jones does not do in the chess-playing
12951998]
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example. To transfer the observations to the loyalty example, con-
sider that my commitment to the revolution is, in part, defined by the
fact that I refuse to use considerations of financial gain to justify
betraying the revolution. 6 In this way, my commitment, as long as it
remains in force, ensures that the financial considerations fail to play
the justificatory-motivational role of a reason for me.
In both of the foregoing scenarios-no motivation, or a refusal to
use as a justification-my loyalty cannot be bought. When Jones is
offered money to betray the revolution, his reaction is, "How much?";
my reaction to a similar question is, "Money is not relevant." I am
shocked atJones. I do not think he means the same by loyalty as I do.
I mean a reason-excluding commitment; Jones does not agree.
Now, what do such commitments have to do with incommensur-
ability? The answer is that they create incommensurability. Thus, I
cannot compare the money-provided reason to betray the revolution
to the loyalty-provided reason not to do so. Such a comparison would
be inconsistent with my commitment. Suppose I were to treat the
comparison of reasons as relevant to my decision; suppose, that is,
that I were to see the comparison of reasons as determining, at least
in part, whether I would betray the revolution. To so regard the com-
parison is to treat the financial considerations as a reason to betray the revolu-
tion, and that is precisely what my commitment does not allow.7 Tocompare a reason is not to exclude it.'8
16 As we remarked supra note 15, a further feature of the justificatory-motivational
role of a reason is that the considerations motivate because the person regards them
as justifying action. It may well be typical of reason-excluding commitments that this
link between justification and motivation is broken.
17 Raz does not explain constitutive incommensurabilities in terms of reason-
excluding commitments. He does, however, come very close to offering such an
explanation. Consider his remarks on selling children:
For many, having children does not have a money price because exchanging
them for money, whether buying or selling, is inconsistent with a proper ap-
preciation of the value of parenthood.... [B]oth their rejection of the idea
that having children has a price and their refusal even to contemplate such
exchanges are part of their respect for parenthood .... [and] of the very high
value they place on having children.
RAZ, supra note 1, at 348.
,S Some may object that the most this shows is that a comparison of reasons cannot
play any role in my decision. But surely--the objection goes-showing that I exclude
the reasons is not the same as showing that I cannot compare them. Why could I not
see the reasons as comparable-although not in a way relevant to deciding whether to
betray the revolution? There is no need to settle this issue. What we care about is the
comparison relevant to deciding what to do. A comparison of reasons irrelevant to
decisionmaking is hardly worth consideration.
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Two further points of clarification are in order. First, there is no
need to argue over words here, over whether "loyalty" really signifies a
reason-excluding commitment. The essential point is that we care
about whether people are the sort who will see financial gain as a
reason to betray commitments to causes, institutions, and other per-
sons, and we have the concept of loyalty to mark the distinction. It is
the difference that matters, not the word that names it. If someone
wants to insist that Jones, who would sell his loyalty for a sufficiently
high price, can be described as loyal, we have nothing to argue about
as long as we recognize the difference and its significance.
Second, I do not claim that there are no circumstances in which
one might betray loyalty for money. Suppose, for example, that I
have a daughter who will die if she does not receive medical treat-
ment costing $1,000,000. I might betray the revolution to get the
money, but, in doing so, I still would not be like Jones. Jones recog-
nizes the financial reasons to have the money as reasons to betray the
revolution; I recognize saving the life of my daughter as a reason to
betray. The financial considerations are considerations I reject as
reasons to betray. In general, I do not mean to suggest that what
loyalty allows and disallows as a reason is well-defined. That is cer-
tainly not true; rather, in general, one discovers case by case what one
will and will not count as a reason.
This understanding of the incommensurability-creating commit-
ments explains why such commitments do not prohibit those house-
hold economies in which one trades goods such as health and safety
against a variety of other goals. One's commitment can prohibit
betraying the revolution for financial gain while allowing one to
allocate one's time between caring for one's family and spying on the
government, or buying a new assault rifle instead of the very safe, but
prohibitively expensive, car in which to drive one's daughter. This is
just what we should expect. In excluding reasons, our commitments
set boundaries to comparison; they block comparisons we otherwise
could make. Such boundary-setting does not prohibit all compari-
sons; that would make life unlivable. Reason-exclusion defines a line
that prohibits some comparisons. To return to the loyalty example,
the essential point is that excluding reasons-possibly different rea-
sons for different people-in part defines loyalty. The boundary the
reason-exclusion defines may differ for different people. But, what-
ever line it defines, the point is that, given the reason-excluding
commitment, one cannot-cannot consistently with the commit-
12971998]
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ment-compare the excluded reasons to reasons one recognizes as
legitimate bases for action.
C. Incommensurability and the Self
Brief reflection should suffice to identify a variety of cases of in-
commensurability now that the loyalty example has revealed the
structure of reason-excluding commitments. Commitments to chil-
dren, to friends, and to ideals, for example, are often reason-
excluding commitments. That such commitments are typically com-
mitments through which we define who we are underscores their
importance, and helps locate their position on the intellectual land-
scape, to note. 9 William James captures the relevant concept of the
self. "I am,"James writes,
often confronted by the necessity of standing by one of my empirical
selves and relinquishing the rest. Not that I would not, if I could, be
both handsome and fat and well dressed, and a great athlete, and make
a million a year, be a wit, a bon-vivant, and a lady-killer, as well as a phi-
losopher; a philanthropist, statesman, warrior, and African explorer, as
well as a 'tone-poet' and saint. But the thing is simply impossible. The
millionaire's work would run counter to the saint's; the bon-vivant and
the philanthropist would trip each other up; the philosopher and the
lady-killer could not well keep house in the same tenement of clay.
Such different characters may conceivably at the outset of life be alike
possible to a man. But to make any one of them actual, the rest must
more or less be suppressed. So the seeker of his truest, strongest, deep-
est self must review the list carefully, and pick out the one on which to
stake his salvation. All other selves thereupon become unreal, but the
fortunes of this self are real. Its failures are real failures, its triumphs
20real triumphs, carrying shame and gladness with them.
James describes a widely shared conception of the self. One makes
oneself the person one is by one's commitments-what one "stands
by." Commitment, as James emphasizes, both opens up some possi-
bilities and closes off others. We are defined as much by what we
cannot do as by what we can. For example, suppose someone sug-
gests to you that, in a committee meeting, you Vote as political expe-
diency dictates, not as your conscience demands. You respond with
shock and outrage, "I cannot do that. What would ever make you
'9 I discuss self-defining commitments in detail in WARNER, supra note 14, at 53-
118.
20 1 WILLIAM JAMEs, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 309-10 (Dover Publications,
Inc. 1950) (1890). The artless sexism of the times ("a man," "lady killer") perhaps
should not go unnoticed.
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think I could? What sort of person do you think I am?" It is com-
monplace for us to define ourselves by what we cannot do.
Similarly, reason-excluding commitments open up some possibili-
ties and close off others. This is why they are particularly impoitant
in defining our identities. Of course, not every identity-defining
commitment is a reason-excluding commitment. The reason-
excluding commitments are simply one important kind of identity-
defining commitment. This is not to say that every reason-excluding
commitment lies at the center of our self-definition. For example,
one might be-as indeed many are-committed to maintaining one's
health in a way that excludes financial considerations as reasons to
forgo needed treatment. But this commitment need not figure
prominently in one's sense of one's identity. Commitments form a
continuum, ranging from those at the center of our self-definition to
those that lie at the periphery. We will return to the connection
between identity and incommensurability when we consider incom-
mensurability's impact on public policy. However, we first should
turn to a crucial objection to our account of incommensurability in
terms of reason-exclusion.
D. The "Underlying Comparison" Objection
Our claim is that in reason-excluding commitments reasons are
excluded, not compared. Thus, in the loyalty example, we claimed
that my commitment to the revolution was defined by my excluding
financial gains as a reason to betray the revolution. The objection is
that we simply have overlooked an obvious way in which an underly-
ing comparison could explain the exclusion. The claim is that
"reason-exclusion," properly understood, dissolves into reason com-
parison. Consider my commitment in the loyalty example. I do have
reasons for that commitment, and, given that I persist in the com-
mitment, I must judge those reasons to be better than the reasons
against having the commitment. Why not take this as the compara-
tive judgment that underlies my excluding the money as a reason to
betray the revolution?
There are two questions to distinguish here. First, can we some-
times compare reasons for and against having a commitment? Sec-
ond, can we always compare reasons for and against having a
commitment? The answer to the first question is clearly yes. Suppose
you are considering a choice between a career as a jazz pianist and a
career as a lawyer. This is a choice between two commitments-a
commitment to the jazz-pianist life plan, or a commitment to the
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lawyer life plan. There might be compelling reasons that one com-
mitment is better than the other. You might, for example, be un-
happy as a jazz musician but not as a lawyer; or perhaps as a jazz
pianist you would create brilliant musical scores in which many would
take pleasure while as a lawyer you would actually do great harm by
21
defending polluting corporations.
Now let us turn to the second question: Can we always compare
reasons for and against having a commitment? We can pose the
question somewhat more precisely by first noting that reasons for or
against having a commitment will always be reasons for or against that
commitment as opposed to another. The choice-of-career example
illustrates such a situation. But, one might object, what of the situa-
tion in which there is just one commitment at issue? Suppose, for
example, that I am simply considering a commitment to a career as a
jazz pianist without the competing possibility of a career as a lawyer.
How is my choice between one commitment and another? The an-
swer lies in the fact that to have an identity as a person involves hav-
ing some set of commitments. Thus, in the scenario just envisioned,
my choice is between adding a commitment to a career as a jazz
pianist, or remaining with my current stock of commitments.
Let us ask then: Given any two possible commitments C and C',
can we rank the totality of reasons to adopt C versus the totality of
reasons to adopt C' as better, worse, or equally good? Let us first
consider answering this question from an objective point of view valid
for all rational agents.2 Suppose we could rank the relevant reasons.
Consider the commitments, as there would undoubtedly be ties, at
the very top of the ranking. These would be the commitments that
would be most rational to have. It is difficult to see how we could
rank commitments in this way unless, to quote John Finnis, "(a)
human beings had some single, well-defined goal or function (a
'dominant end'), or (b) the differing goals which men in fact pursue
22 See RAZ, supra note 1, at 341 (demonstrating why certain commitments are
superior).
2 We will leave this talk of points of view at an intuitive level. Thomas Nagel's
work is, of course, the current locus classicus here. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW
FROM NOWHERE (1986). A point of view valid for all rational agents would be one that
a person would have to adopt to count as rational. Of course, some will still question
whether such a point of view exists with respect to substantive moral issues. For a
discussion of relevant issues, see STEPHEN L. DARWALL, IMPARTIAL REASON (1983), and
Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Darwall on Practical Reason, 96 ETHICS 604 (1986) (reviewing
DARWALL, supra).
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had some common factor, such as 'satisfaction of desire."'3 But, as
Finnis notes, "neither of these conditions obtains. Only an inhumane





A brief comment is in order on the role of this argument in
Finnis's work. It is Finnis's argument that "basic goods" are incom-
mensurable. A basic good is an experience, activity, or item that one
must value to qualify as rational (we may put aside disputes over
whether basic goods in the relevant sense exist).z Finnis takes it to be
clear that there is a plurality of basic goods, and he contends-
certainly correctly-that it is very implausible to think that all the
possible tradeoffs among basic goods can be ranked as better, worse,
or equally good. Our argument that ranking is impossible for com-
mitments rests on very similar grounds. There is obviously a plurality
of possible commitments, and, for the reasons Finnis gives, it is mani-
festly implausible to think that all possible commitments could be
ranked as better, worse, or equally good.
So much for a comparison based on an impersonal point of view.
Now, let us turn to a comparison based on a personal-or at least less-
than-universal-point of view. For convenience, I label any less-than-
universal point of view "personal." Returning to the choice-of-career
example, suppose you are considering a choice between a career as a
jazz pianist and a career as a lawyer. A personal perspective might
provide grounds for choice.' For example, if it has been your life-long
dream to be a creative artist, then other things being equal, this
might be a sufficient ground to choose being a jazz musician over
being a lawyer. However, it could be that no such ground distinguish
the two careers. Imagine that, on the one hand, you have values that
pull you toward the lawyer-life: You value stability in personal and
financial matters, and you value the role lawyers play in the legal
system. Consequently, you have reasons to choose the life as a lawyer.
On the other hand, suppose that you also have reasons to choose the
life of a jazz musician, for you have values that pull you toward that
life: You adhere to an ideal of creative expression in music, an art for
which you have a deep love. In this scenario, from the perspective of
the lawyer-values, you have better reason to choose to be a lawyer. Yet
from the perspective of the jazz musician-values, you have better
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 113 (5th prtg. 1988).
24 Id.
2 For Finnis, such goods include: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience,
sociability, practical reasonableness, and religion. Seeid. at 85-90.
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reason to be a musician. To choose either career is to consign the
values realized in the other career to a minor-and perhaps eventu-
ally vanishing-role. You are pulled both ways, and your problem is
that your current point of view includes both sets of values, but does
not provide any neutral perspective from which to adjudicate between
the competing reasons. There is no neutral perspective from which
you can assess the choices as better, worse, or equally good. Conse-
quently, you must arrive at, or construct, such a perspective. Until
this is done, you oscillate uncomfortably between the alternatives-
unable to decide, but pulled toward this one, then that one. Moreo-
ver, you would be unlikely to adopt an arbitrary decision procedure,
such as flipping a coin; or, if you did, it would not be a sign of indif-
ference, but of desperation, of an inability to decide in any other way.
The clarification and resolution of the values you seek cannot be
achieved by such arbitrary mechanisms.
We find ourselves not infrequently in such situations. Our per-
sonal perspectives hardly provide complete maps to guide us through
the decisions we must make; rather, they offer sketches that leave
large areas barely filled in, if filled in at all. Moreover, our perspec-
tives not atypically incorporate competing, or outright inconsistent,
claims and views. David Wiggins has aptly captured these aspects of
practical reasoning:
No theory, if it is to recapitulate or reconstruct practical reasoning even
as well as mathematical logic recapitulates or reconstructs the actual ex-
perience of conducting or exploring deductive argument, can treat the
concerns which an agent brings to any situation as forming a closed,
complete, consistent system. For it is of the essence of these concerns to
make competing and inconsistent claims. (This is a mark not of irra-
tionality but of rationality in the face of the plurality of ends and the plu-
rality of human goods.) The weight of... these concerns is not
necessarily fixed in advance. Nor need the concerns be hierarchically
ordered. Indeed, a man's reflection on a new situation that confronts
him may disrupt such order and fixity as had previously existed, and
bring a change in his evolving conception of the point.., or the several
or many points, of living or acting.
This completes our argument that constitutive incommensurabil-
ity exists. However, before turning to its role in public policy, it is
worth distinguishing constitutive incommensurability from another
kind of incommensurability, a kind that, for want of a better term, I
David Wiggins, Deliberation and Practical Reason, in ESSAYS ON ARIsTOTLE'S ETHIcs
221, 233 (Amdlie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980) (endnote omitted).
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call "plain incommensurability." These were not distinguished earlier
because it is only in the context of the foregoing discussion that we
can make the distinction clearly.
E. Plain Versus Constitutive Incommensurability
Plain incommensurability arises when we lack a perspective from
which to rank reasons as better, worse, or equally good. To contrast
plain and constitutive incommensurability, consider the following
example. Katrina is a Russian engineer in the 1930s who favors the
development of the untouched Russian Steppe. She believes that
"'[o]ur steppe will truly become ours only when we come with col-
umns of tractors and.., break the thousand-year-old virgin soil. On a
far-flung front we must wage war. We must burrow into the earth,
break rocks, dig mines, construct houses. We must take from the
earth.'"2 7 Katrina's vision is of humans as masters of the earth, trans-
forming it in their image, and she emphasizes the enormous benefits
to the Russian people of an industrialized steppe. But she has never
seen the steppe, and when she finally travels through it, she is over-
come with awe at the untamed and untouched vastness of it all. Now,
imagine that Katrina faces a dilemma similar to the choice-of-career
example discussed earlier. On the one hand, from her "columns of
tractors" perspective, she has compelling reasons to exploit the
steppe; on the other hand, from the perspective of her sense of awe,
she has compelling reasons to leave it untouched. As with the choice-
of-career example, she lacks any neutral perspective from which to
evaluate these reasons as better, worse, or equally good.
The point to emphasize is that Katrina's incommensurability need
not involve any reason-excluding commitments, although it could. In
other words, it could be definitive of the particular form her awe takes
that she excludes benefiting the Russian people as a reason to exploit
the steppe. But this need not be true. Awe can exist without such a
reason-exclusion. We can conceive of Katrina's incommensurability
as arising simply because she has competing concerns and no per-
27Albert E. Burke, Influence of Man upon Nature-The Russian View: A Case Study, in
MAN'S RoLE IN CHANGING THE FACE OF THE EARTH 1035, 1048 (William L. Thomas, Jr.
ed., 1956) (quoting a passage from a 1929 textbook used in the former Soviet Union
for the education of 12- to 14-year-olds); see also CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, EARTH AND
OTHER ETHICS 112 (1987) (arguing that "[a] true earth ethic would answer 'yes'" to
the question "whether there is any cause to condemn an action that radically disturbs
the environment but represents a net welfare gain for humans, even when the re-
duced value of the environment is accounted for").
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spective from which to rank the relevant reasons as better, worse, or
equally good.
Plain incommensurability certainly is relevant to public policy and
deserves careful study. With regard to public policy, John Finnis has
done the ground-breaking work in this area.28 Our concern, however,
is with constitutive incommensurability, because it has been less
studied and raises special problems for public policy. Thus, for the
remainder of this Article, by "incommensurability," I mean constitu-
tive incommensurability.
III. DOES INCOMMENSURABILITY MATTER?-FIRST PASS
We have made a case that incommensurability exists, but have we
not-in explaining incommensurability as a matter of personal com-
mitment-also shown that it is irrelevant to public policy? Consider
the town budget example again. 29 Suppose I am a member of the
town council who must vote on the budget, and that the council must
cut funding to either the schools or the police. Assume further that
the alternative is raising taxes, an option that the council already has
rejected as economically unwise and politically inexpedient. Imagine
that I have a commitment to public safety, defined in part by exclud-
ing the raising of taxes as a reason not to fund the police. Accord-
ingly, I make an impassioned plea for my position, but the majority
votes to fund the schools and not the police. I demand an explana-
tion, and, indeed, I am entitled to an answer.
Legitimacy demands that the council be able to explain why its
decision is not "capricious or arbitrary or discriminatory."0 But why is
the following not an adequate answer? The majority of the council
acknowledges that I have made a case for a certain outcome-funding
the schools instead of the police-but the problem is that others have
made out conflicting cases. The council's task is to evaluate these
competing contentions and arrive at a budget. How is the council to
do so unless they compare reasons and rank options? Furthermore,
the council notes that it arrived at its ranking by a legitimate, demo-
cratic decisionmaking process, one that took my considerations into
2' See FINNIS, supra note 23, at 134-60, 134 (undertaking a "fuller analysis of the
proper relationship between one's own well-being and the well-being of others7);John
Finnis, Commensuration and Public Reason, inINCOMMENSURABILITY, supra note 1, at 215.
See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
30 See Dworkin, supra note 3, at 374.
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account as reasons to fund the police, but that, in the end, it found
the reasons to fund the schools to be more compelling.
In short, the council compared reasons.3
1 But why should it not?
The council had to rank the budgetary options, and what is wrong
with a public decisionmaker doing so by comparing reasons for and
against the various options? Indeed, democratic legitimacy would
seem to require public decisionmakers to proceed in this way. In
doing so, the council has not ignored my personal, incommensurabil-
ity-creating commitment. It has taken my commitment into account
as a reason to decide in my favor, but has decided against my interest.
What is wrong with such a procedure? Why should a public deci-
sionmaker be barred from comparing reasons by my personal com-
S, Some will object that selecting policy is not a matter of comparing reasons, but
of aggregating preferences. Preference-summing, however, is an acceptable collective-
decision procedure only within appropriate moral constraints. No one, for example,
considers the preferences of child molesters as on. par with preferences for literature
over television. We only consider certain preferences. More generally, as Pildes and
Anderson argue:
Rational choice should not be understood as a matter of satisfying unde-
fended preferences, but of articulating good and convincing reasons for
choices. Especially in democratic political contexts, choices must be justified
through publicly articulable and acceptable reasons. Institutions for making
collective choices should be designed to promote deliberative rationality un-
derstood in this way; a central criterion for judging political institutions ought
to be whether they promote the activity of reason-giving and create contexts
in which reason-giving can have a decisive influence over the actual choices
made.
Pildes & Anderson, supra note 6, at 2193. Pildes and Anderson regard these remarks
as an elaboration of an ideal of "'deliberative politics,'" id. at 2193 n.185, that they find
in the following articles: Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of
Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291, 372-78 (1986); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the
Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1341-49 (1988); and Frank I. Michelman, The
Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 76
(1986). A similar ideal seems to inspire "conversational" conceptions of political
legitimacy. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, in PRAGMATISM IN
LAW & SOCIETY 127 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991). Michelman dis-
cusses Radin's views in Frank Michelman, Aitae Personal but Not Split: Radin Versus
Rorty, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1783 (1990).
Joseph Singer is also a notable advocate of a "conversational" conception of
legitimacy. SeeJoseph William Singer, Should Lauyers CareAbout Philosophy?, 1989 DUKE
LJ. 1752 (book review). For a discussion of this aspect of Singer's views, see Richard
Warner, Why Pragmatism? The Puzzling Place of Pragmatism in Critical Theory, 1993 U. ILL.
L. REV. 535, 555-63. Additionally, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION
(1993), provides a major book-length exposition of a conception of deliberative
democracy. For a discussion of Sunstein's views, and of deliberative democracy in
general, see James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV.
211, 241-79 (1993). Sunstein replies to Fleming in Cass R. Sunstein, Liberal Constitu-
tionalism and LiberalJustic4 72 TEX. L. REV. 305 (1993).
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mitment that prevents me from making the comparison with other
reasons?
I will answer this question in the context provided by an examina-
tion of rational choice theory. I will argue that rational choice theory
rests on an assumption that is inconsistent with incommensurability.
Incommensurability's implications for public policy are particularly
clear against this rational choice theory background. Furthermore,
the inconsistency we will identify reveals a fundamental flaw in ra-
tional choice theory. Rational choice theory is the theoretical foun-
dation of law and economics. Law and economics is a dominant force
in legal scholarship and, to some extent, in the formation of public
policy. It is well worth seeing that it rests on a deeply flawed theory.
A. Rational Choice Theoiy
What is rational choice theory? The heart of the theory is the
expected-utility rule.33 Stating the rule against the background of
certain facts about action throws the rule into sharp relief and reveals
the assumption. The facts are basic and uncontroversial. I will de-
scribe them using the notion of a reason, or more precisely, a consid-
eration playing the justificatory-motivational role of a reason. Some
will object that the notion of a reason is irrelevant to rational choice
theory. Rational choice theory concerns preferences, not reasons. It
is a theory about what action a rational person will perform, given
certain preferences. Our exposition of rational choice theory in
terms of reasons is, however, not inconsistent with this fact; quite to
the contrary, it reveals why we can-apparently-drop talk of reasons
32 I take rational choice theory to lie at the heart of "positive political theory."
There is considerable disagreement over just what constitutes positive political theory.
See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theoy in the Nineties,
80 GEo. L.J. 457, 457-63 (1992) (exploring "the conflicting views of the symposium
participants about PPT [positive political theory] and its relationship to public
choice").
33 More precisely, the heart of rational choice theory is some version of the ex-
pected-utility rule. Disconfirming evidence has proven fertile ground for the prolif-
eration of suggested revisions. Tversky and Kahneman provide a list of proposed
revisions. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of
Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, S271 (Supp. 1986). For a detailed review of proposed
revisions, see Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making in THE HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 587 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995). We can,
however, put these revisions to one side. Our concern is with a fundamental assump-
tion that remains in all revisions, and, in articulating and evaluating this assumption,
we can take the simple and convenient course of focusing on the classical form of the
expected-utility rule.
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in favor of talk of preferences. The "apparently" qualification is
crucial, for it is precisely here that we encounter the mistaken as-
sumption.
Let us turn then to the relevant facts about action. Suppose you
are trying to choose between going to law school to become a lawyer
and retiring to the woods to write your first novel. You choose to go
to law school. You do so even though you think the balance of rea-
sons weighs much more heavily in favor of life as a successful novelist,
rather than life as a successful lawyer. The explanation for your
choice is that this assessment of reasons is not the sole determinant of
your choice. You also consider the probability of succeeding at realiz-
ing each option.3 More fully, you combine an assessment of reasons
and probability considerations to obtain a ranking of the actions of
going to law school and of retiring to the woods. You think that you
are unlikely to succeed in writing even one novel and highly likely to
succeed in graduating from law school with a law degree. These
probability considerations lead you to rank going to law school ahead
of retiring to the woods, and you act accordingly. In contrast, the
following is an example in which the strength of reason compensates
for low probability: As you stand in front of the ice-cream store, the
probability that buying an ice-cream cone will lead to the pleasure of
eating it is high, but you pass up the virtually certain pleasure for the
far less certain benefit of entering the bookstore next door. The
explanation lies in the strength of the relevant reasons. The thought
of reading an interesting book plays the justificatory-motivational role
of a reason for you, as does the contemplation of the ice-cream eating
pleasure. You find the former reason so much more compelling that
you rank entering the bookstore higher than buying an ice-cream
cone, despite the low probability of finding an interesting book.
There is a crucial distinction to draw here. The distinction is be-
tween payoffs of actions, for example, being a lawyer or being a suc-
cessful novelist, and the actions aimed at realizing the payoffs, such as
going to law school or retiring to the woods. Very roughly, a payoff is
what one gets out of performing an action; it is a result the action
yields.35 The crucial point is that one ranks payoffs in light of reasons;
34 It does not matter for our purpose whether the probabilities are objective or
subjective.
- It need not be a causal result. See supra note 14. Also, to avoid misunderstand-
ing, we should note that a payoff (that for the sake of which the action is performed)
might itself be an action. What I get out of the action of entering the bookstore is
reading or buying a book, which certainly qualifies as an action. In general, the
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for example, you may rank being a successful novelist over being a
successful lawyer because certain considerations make a much more
compelling case for the former than the latter. Talk of "ranking" is
talk of choice. To say that you rank being a novelist over being a
lawyer is to say that, in appropriate circumstances, 6 the reasons that
favor being a novelist-the complex of considerations playing the
justificatory-motivational role of a reason-would lead you to choose
the former over the latter. (These are not choices under uncertainty,
but choices with certainty; the choice is between the certain payoff of
being a lawyer, and the certain payoff of being a novelist.) In general,
given a range of payoffs, we can rank them in terms of which payoff
you would choose over which others. s7 Let us call this the "payoff-
ranking."
Now let us turn from payoffs to actions. The payoff-ranking is not
a ranking of actions. One ranks actions-such as going to law school
and entering the bookstore-by combining probability considerations
with the payoff-ranking. So, for example, you rank going to law
school over retiring to the woods because of probability considera-
tions. Let us call the result of such combination the "action-ranking"
(and thus, unlike the payoff-ranking, the action-ranking essentially
involves probabilities). Again, talk of "ranking" is talk of choice.
Combining the reasons that rank payoffs with probability considera-
tions provides reasons for action. These considerations guide choices
by playing the justificatory-motivational role of a reason, and to say
that going to law school ranks higher than retiring to the woods to
payoff/action distinction is relative to the context in which an agent acts; given the
context, and a range of actions open to the agent in that context, we readily can
distinguish between action (entering the bookstore) and payoff (reading or buying a
book). Given our purposes, there is no need to be more precise.
The "appropriate circumstances" qualification is essential. Suppose you were
offered a choice between being a successful novelist and being a successful lawyer in
circumstances in which you would be killed if you opted for either. You undoubtedly
would choose neither. In applying rational choice theory to such examples, a great
deal depends on how one describes the choice. Rational choice theory tends to be
rather unsophisticated in its approach to identifying and describing choices. Theo-
rists tend to ignore the problems of intentionality that have preoccupied philoso-
phers. SeeJean Hampton, The Failure of Expected-Utility Theory as a Theory of Reason, 10
ECON. & PHIL. 195 (1994).
s7 Such unique ranking may not exist, for we cannot uniquely determine the truth
or falsity of the counterfactual statement, "You would choose payoff 0 over payoff 0 '"
Its truth or falsity will vary as we vary the detail and breadth of the background as-
sumptions against which we assess its truth. We will put these issues to one side.
Basically, these considerations mean that rational choice theorists have to predict
action against some fixed set of background assumptions.
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write a novel is to say that the relevant considerations would, in ap-
propriate circumstances, lead you to choose to go to law school over
retiring to the woodsy Insofar as one is rational, one performs the
action that ranks highest in one's action-ranking.
The action-ranking, as we have just seen, is a construct of two
more basic elements: the payoff-ranking and probability considera-
tions. If we could predict what action-ranking a person would con-
struct out of a given payoff-ranking and set of probability
considerations, we could predict choices from the knowledge of these
two basic elements alone. To do so, of course, we need to know the
rule or procedure by which one combines probabilities and payoff-
rankings to obtain action-rankings. What rule do we use? Reflection
suggests a plausible hypothesis. When we combine value and prob-
ability, we give weight to value and weight to probability: The greater
the value or probability, the greater the effect we give it in determin-
ing the action-ranking. There is a simple mathematical way to repre-
sent such a procedure-multiplication: The bigger (smaller) the
multiplicand, the bigger (smaller) it makes the product.
This is just how expected-utility theory represents the rule. The
rule represents probabilities by numbers, of course, and it represents
a person's payoff-ranking by a utility function. The utility of a payoff
is a number that indicates the place of that payoff in the person's
payoff-ranking. This is all we need to note; the exact mathematical
structure of the utility function will not concern us.
3 Rather, we want
to focus on the rule for combining utility and probability. To see how
the expected utility rule does this, suppose A is an action with only
two possible payoffs, 0 and not-O. Using u for the relevant utility
function, their respective utilities are u(O) and u(not-O). Using P for
the probability that A will yield the payoff 0, the expected utility of
the action A is:
(P x (u(O)) + ((1 - P) x u(not-O)).
40
We can construct an action-ranking by calculating the expected
utility of each relevant action. Rational choice theory asserts that
rational agents perform the action at the top of the ranking so con-
Again, the "appropriate circumstances" qualification is essential (and perhaps
more difficult to spell out in this context), and again, in general, there may be no
unique ranking generated by counterfactual claims about what one would choose. See
supra notes 36-37.
3' For some discussion, see George A. Quattrone & Amos Tversky, Contrasting and
PsychologicalAnalyses of Political Choice 82 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 719 (1988).
40 Probabilities must sum to 1; this is why the probability of realizing not-O is 1 -P.
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structed, the action with the greatest expected utility. This is the
rational choice theory version of the common-sense fact that a person
performs the action highest in the person's action-ranking.
We began this exposition of rational choice theory to reveal a
fundamental assumption behind the theory, and the assumption is
now clear. The assumption is that only two things matter to con-
structing the action-ranking: utility-the relative ranking of payoffs-
and the relevant probabilities of realizing those payoffs. The crucial
point is that reasons are assumed to be relevant only to determining
the payoff-ranking. Once that is established, a person's reasons play
no further role in predicting behavior.4' This assumption lies behind
the use of the notion of preference in rational choice theory, and we
can further illustrate the assumption's role by seeing why we can-if
the assumption is correct-drop talk of reasons in favor of talk of
preference. To see why, consider that we need to know the payoff-
ranking to construct the action-ranking, but all that matters about the
payoff-ranking is the order of the payoffs. All we need to know is
whether the person would, in appropriate circumstances, choose one
payoff over another. The person's reasons may explain the choice,
but we do not care why the person would choose the payoff; we only
care that the person would choose it. So why be concerned with
reasons at all? All it seems we really care about is preference, where
one prefers a to b when, and only when, one would choose a over b in
relevant circumstances. 2
So it seems, but this appearance is an illusion. We cannot always
confine reasons to the construction of the payoff-ranking. Incom-
mensurability shows that reasons sometimes play a role in the proce-
41 This remains true in all proposed revisions of rational choice theory-with the
possible exception of prospect theory. In prospect theory, the role of frame selection
and the use of a decision weight instead of probabilities may allow values to play some
role in directly determining an action's place in the action-ranking. At this stage in
the development of prospect theory, it is difficult to say how this issue will turn out.
For an interesting application of prospect theory to the law, see Richard L. Hasen,
Efficiency Under Informational Asymmetiy: The Effect of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 391 (1990).
42 Of course, there is a point to replacing value with preference only if we have
some way to determine a person's preferences independent of information about a
person's values, but there is an obvious technique here: Ask the person. This is the
tactic contingent valuation takes. We ask how much one would be willing to pay to
have one payoff or another. If one is willing to pay more to have a than b, one would
choose a over b, and thus a ranks higher than b in the payoff-ranking. This does not
mean that value is irrelevant. A person's values do determine a person's preferences,
but, as far as rational choice theory is concerned, it seems we safely can relegate value
to the undiscussed background.
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dure by which a rational person constructs the action-ranking out of
the payoff-ranking and the probabilities. In such cases, rational
choice theory makes the wrong predictions, for it constructs the
wrong action-ranking.
B. The Inconsistency
A variant of the loyalty example makes the point. Suppose a
stranger offers me a lottery. If I enter the lottery, I have a 50%
chance of getting $1,000,000 without betrayal, and a 50% chance of
getting $1,000,000 in exchange for betraying the revolution. I refuse.
When I refuse, the stranger changes the probabilities. He offers me a
70% chance of getting $1,000,000 without betrayal, and a 30% chance
of getting $1,000,000 in exchange for betrayal. When I refuse again,
the stranger offers me .... We can continue the scenario by imagin-
ing that I persist in refusing and that the stranger continues to im-
prove the odds.
From the expected-utility point of view, the stranger is increasing
the expected value of entering the lottery by offering ever more
favorable probabilities. When we construct the action-ranking by the
expected-utility rule, these increases move the choice of entering the
lottery higher and higher in my action-ranking; at some point, the
stranger will succeed in offering a lottery that has a greater expected
utility.43 The expected-utility rule predicts that I will accept the offer
at that point.
This prediction, however, is wrong. I will never accept the
stranger's offer since I treat the monetary considerations as simply
irrelevant to my decision. Whatever reason these considerations
provide to betray the revolution is a reason I exclude; instead, I pro-
ceed exactly as if the money provided no reason at all to betray. So,
insofar as I am rational, I will not sell my loyalty because I have a
reason not to sell (my commitment to the revolution), and no rea-
son-no reason that I will consider-to do otherwise. This means
that not betraying the revolution always will rank higher than any
action that involves betraying it no matter what the relevant probabili-
ties. Let me express this by saying that the action of remaining loyal
occupies a rigid place in my action-ranking. Its position vis-A-vis
relevant alternatives cannot be changed by altering the relevant prob-
abilities. My commitment to the revolution explains this action-
4 This assumes that remaining loyal has some finite utility. See infra note 44.
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ranking rigidity. My commitment guarantees that I will never take
the money. That is, the action of remaining loyal will always rank
higher than the action of betrayal in my action-ranking. In such
cases, reasons play a role in determining directly (not merely via the
payoff-ranking) the action-ranking; reasons directly create a rigidity in
that ranking. Reasons cannot be confined to a role in constructing
the payoff-ranking."
There are two further points to note. First, although I have just
emphasized that incommensurability concerns the place of an action
in the action-ranking, it is, however, also true that incommensurabil-
ity concerns the place of payoffs in the payoff-ranking. The loyalty
example makes this clear. Consider Jones. The place of the payoff
for betraying the revolution in Jones's payoff-ranking is a function of
the strength of the reasons he has for betrayal: The greater the dollar
amount, the stronger the reason to betray. When the dollar amount
is sufficient, betrayal moves above remaining loyal in Jones's payoff-
ranking. In my case, increasing the dollar amount cannot move
betrayal above remaining loyal in my payoff-ranking; my reason-
excluding commitment makes the offer of the money irrelevant to my
decision to remain loyal. If we just focused on the payoff-ranking
rigidity, we could not fully explain the difference between Jones and
me in the loyalty example. To see why, let u(betray) and u(loyal) repre-
sent my respective utilities for betraying the revolution and remaining
loyal; and let u' (betray) and u' (loyal) represent the same for Jones.
Now, u(loyal) > u(betray), and u' (loyal) > u' (betray). In my case, u(loyal)
> u(betray) because of my reason-excluding commitment to the revolu-
tion; for Jones, u'(loyal) > u'(betray) because Jones compares reasons
and finds his reasons to remain loyal to be better than his money-
based reasons to betray. The point is that-unless more is said-this
difference in the reasons behind our respective payoff-rankings does
not explain the rigidity in my action-ranking and the lack of such
rigidity in Jones's action-ranking.
The second point is that it is the action-ranking rigidity that is
most relevant to public policy. To see why, return to the town budget
example. Recall that the majority of the town council explained that
" The obvious objection is that we indeed can confine value to this role if we are
willing to assign an infinite utility to the payoff of keeping my daughter. If we assign
infinite utility, then no matter what changes one makes in relevant probabilities, not
selling always will rank higher than any competing action. In this way, the expected-
utility rule can yield rigid action-rankings. I answer this objection in Warner, supra
note 2.
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it considered my incommensurability-based claim that the town
should fund the schools, but they noted that others made conflicting
claims, and they adjudicated among these claims by comparing rea-
sons and ranking options. The problem is that the council's deci-
sionmaking process did not address my position; it ignored it. The
council treated my incommensurability claim as if it were only rele-
vant to ranking payoffs-the payoff of funded schools versus the
payoff of funded police. But my point is precisely that the incom-
mensurability imposes a constraint directly on the action-ranking, the
ranking of budgetary options. My claim is that funding the schools
occupies a rigid position in that action-ranking, a position that en-
sures that the council will opt to fund the schools. My contention is
that the reason-excluding commitment to education-my commit-
ment, and the one I urge the council to adopt-establishes this posi-
tion, and that it is inconsistent with this commitment to rank funding
the schools by comparing reasons.
There is then a genuine conflict between incommensurability and
the requirement that public decisionmakers decide by comparing
relevant reasons. In framing public policy, decisionmakers cannot
simply treat incommensurability-based claims as one more reason for
or against a particular policy option. Such a claim concerns the
ranking of actions, and the claim is precisely that certain actions
occupy a rigid point in the ranking-a point not determined by
comparing reasons, but by a reason-excluding commitment inconsis-
tent with such a comparison.
How, then, should public decisionmakers handle incommensur-
ability claims? The seriousness of this question depends on the ex-
tent to which we encounter incommensurable reasons in crucial areas
of public policy. If we do not encounter them often, then the conflict
is not a serious practical threat. How often do we encounter such
reasons? I will answer by describing a single case. This instance will
serve as a template. Once one knows what to look for, incommensur-
ability is easy to spot.
IV. DOES INCOMMENSURABILTYMAWIER?-SECOND PASS
Moore v. Regents of the University of Calforni 45 provides the tem-
plate. A doctor at the UCLA Medical Center treated John Moore for
hairy-cell leukemia. To slow down the progress of the disease, the
4 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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doctor removed Moore's spleen. The splenectomy was an appropri-
ate treatment for Moore's condition. The doctor, however, realized
that the removed spleen had great commercial value.46 Without
obtaining Moore's consent, he developed a cell line from the genetic
material obtained from the spleen and applied for a patent4 7 Obtain-
ing the material took considerable effort and expertise. Moore him-
self could not have obtained this material; only a trained researcher
could. In exchange for this material, Moore's doctor was given
75,000 shares of stock in the private company that bought the mate-
rial, and the doctor and UCLA together were given nearly $450,000
over a three-year period. 8 When Moore discovered that the doctor
was selling the genetic material from Moore's spleen, Moore sued,
claiming, among other things, that he had a property right in the
genetic material.49 The California Supreme Court rejected Moore's
claim.5"
The majority decided the case by comparing reasons. The major-
ity acknowledged that there were reasons, advanced by Moore, to
recognize a property right in the genetic material. Moore's basic
claim was that the property right existed as a corollary of his right to
control what happened in and to his body;5' he argued that the right
extended to the genetic material extracted from his spleen.5 2 The
majority, however, found reasons not to agree.5 3 In particular, they
emphasized that researchers used human cell lines stored in vast
numbers in tissue repositories. Recognizing Moore's claim would,
the majority contended, "threaten with disabling civil liability inno-
cent parties who are engaged in socially useful activity, such as re-
searchers who have no reason to believe that their use of a particular
cell sample is, or may be, against a donor's wishes."5' In addition,
recognizing the claim would hinder "[r]esearch on human cells
'6 See id. at 481.
4 See id. at 481-82.
'a See id.
41 See id. at 482 & n.4.
"' See id. at 480.
51 This reason is most clearly discussed by Justice Broussard. See id. at 500-03
(BroussardJ., concurring and dissenting).
52 See id. at 487.
53 In addition to the hindering-research-and-protecting-researchers reason, see id.
at 494, the majority advanced statutory arguments for denying the property right, see
id. at 489-91, contended that there was no good common-law precedent for doing so,
see id. at 487, and suggested that common-law actions besides conversion adequately
protected the interests of patients in situations like Moore's, see id. at 493-94.
"' Id. at 493.
] INCOMMENSURABILITYAND PUBLIC POLICY
[that] plays a critical role in medical research."5 The majority con-
cluded that there was a good reason to deny the property right. Let
me refer to these reasons as the "research" reasons. The majority
compared reasons, and, unfortunately for Moore, they found the
research reasons to be the better ones.
The majority's comparative approach provoked a strong dissent
from Justice Mosk. He contended that:
[O]ur society acknowledges a profound ethical imperative to respect the
human body as the physical and temporal expression of the unique hu-
man persona. One manifestation of that respect is our prohibition
against direct abuse of the body by torture .... Another is our prohibi-
tion against indirect abuse of the body by its economic exploitation for
the sole benefit of another person. The most abhorrent form of such
exploitation, of course, was the institution of slavery. Lesser forms, such
as indentured servitude or even debtor's prison, have also disappeared.
Yet their specter haunts the laboratories and boardrooms of today's bio-
technological research-industrial complex. It arises whenever scientists
or industrialists claim, as defendants claim here, the right to appropriate
and exploit a patient's tissue for their sole economic benefit-the right,
in other words, to freely mine or harvest valuable physical properties of
the patient's body: ".... . Such research tends to treat the human body
as a commodity-a means to a profitable end. The dignity and sanctity
with which we regard the human whole, body as well as mind and soul,
are absent when we allow researchers to further their own interests
without the patient's participation by using a patient's cells as the basis
for a marketable product"56
Justice Mosk clearly thought that the majority undervalued, or even
ignored, the value we place on persons.
Justice Mosk's position admits of tvo interpretations. The first
sees him as contending that the majority's mistake consists in compar-
ing wrongly. On this interpretation, Justice Mosk's point would be
that the "dignity" reasons to recognize the property right are better
than the research reasons not to recognize such a right. The alterna-
tive interpretation sees Justice Mosk as asserting an incommensurabil-
ity: The "'dignity and sanctity with which we regard the human
whole'" 57 mean that we should exclude the research reasons from
consideration. On this interpretation, the majority's mistake does not
consist in comparing reasons wrongly-it consists in comparing rea-
'5 Id. at 494.
Id. at 515-16 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Mary Taylor Danforth, Calls, Sales,
and Royalties: The Patient's Right to a Portion of the Profits, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 179, 190
(1990) (footnote omitted)).
57 Id. at 516 (Mosk,J., dissenting) (quoting Danforth, supra note 56, at 190).
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sons at all. To assert an incommensurability claim is to hold that the
relevant comparison is impossible, not that it is made wrongly.
Which interpretation better represents Justice Mosk's views?s We
can begin by noting that there is a serious problem with the
"compared wrongly" interpretation. The problem is thatJustice Mosk
made absolutely no attempt to show that the dignity reasons actually
were better than the research reasons. This aspect of Justice Mosk's
dissent baffled Justice Arabian, who wrote:
I share Justice Mosk's sense of outrage, but I cannot follow its path. His
eloquent paean to the human spirit illuminates the problem, but not
the solution. Does it uplift or degrade the "unique human persona" to
treat human tissue as a fungible article of commerce? Would it advance
or impede the human condition, spiritually or scientifically, by deliver-
ing the majestic force of the law behind the plaintiff's claim? I do not
know the answers to these troubling questions, nor am I willing-like
Justice Mosk-to treat them ... as issues... susceptible of judicial reso-
lution.
59
Justice Arabian's questions have considerable force, if we thinkJustice
Mosk was comparing reasons. If he was, Justice Mosk's confidence
was entirely misplaced when he claimed that "'the dignity and sanctity
with which we regard the human whole, body as well as mind and
soul, are absent when we allow researchers to further their own inter-
ests without the patient's participation by using a patient's cells as the
basis for a marketable product."' 60 How did Justice Mosk know that
this was how the complex and controversial comparison of reasons
finally would come out? Perhaps allowing researchers to further their
own interests actually would promote personal dignity as medical
research saved lives, as well as prevented the degeneration and loss of
dignity involved in the debilitating diseases that would take their toll
in old age.
The incommensurability interpretation makes this worry irrele-
vant. On this interpretation, Justice Mosk had no need to explain
why the comparison of reasons would come out a certain way, because
no comparison was involved. To assert an incommensurability is to
claim that the relevant comparison is impossible. The question is,
58 Justice Mosk himself described his approach as a straightforward balancing of
reasons: "[I)n my view whatever merit the majority's single policy consideration may
have is outweighed by two contrary considerations .... " Id. at 515 (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added). For reasons that follow, I think Justice Mosk misinterpreted his
own position.
5" Id. at 497-98 (Arabian,J., concurring).
'0 Id. at 516 (MoskJ., dissenting) (quoting Danforth, supra note 56, at 190).
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what kind of commitment would entail a reason-exclusion here? A
closer reading of Justice Mosk's dissent reveals the answer. In Justice
Mosk's eyes, the researchers treated Moore's body as an inanimate
object to be exploited-a mine from which to extract ore, or a field
from which to harvest a crop: The researchers claimed "the
right... to freely mine or harvest valuable physical properties of the
patient's body."6 Justice Mosk also compared the researcher's treat-
ment of Moore to the violations of the body involved in torture, slav-
ery, indentured servitude, and debtor's prison.62
Let us focus on the analogy to torture. Imagine we capture a ter-
rorist who has planted a bomb in an elementary school. Our problem
is that we do not know which school contains the bomb. If we can
only find this crucial information out by torturing the terrorist, we
have a reason to torture; torturing the terrorist is the only means of
finding out where the bomb is. Of course, we also have reasons not to
torture, such as the horrible pain and the grotesque violation of the
value and dignity of persons. But, for many people, we do not de-
cide whether to torture by comparing the reasons for and against
doing so-a comparison that would come out against torture only in
some circumstances, while favoring it in others. The value we place
on people prohibits deciding in this way; it creates an absolute and
total ban on torture (or at least a nearly absolute and total 
ban).64
6' Id. (MoskJ., dissenting).
62 See id. at 515 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
0 See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, War and Massacre, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 53, 73 (1979)
("Even if certain types of dirty tactics become acceptable when the stakes are high
enough, the most serious of the prohibited acts, like murder and torture, are not just
supposed to require unusually strong justification. They are supposed never to be
done, because no quantity of resulting benefit is thought capable of justifying such
treatment of a person."). For an extended discussion and criticism of consequentialist
ethics, see SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 1-13 (1982).
64 Thomas Nagel, for example, holds such a position:
[T]he constraints on action represented by rights cannot be equivalent to an
assignment of large disvalue to their violation, for that would make it permis-
sible to violate such a right if by doing so one could prevent more numerous
or more serious violations of the same right by others. This is not in general
true. It is not permissible.., to kill an innocent person even to prevent the
deliberate killing of three other innocent persons. A general feature of any-
thing worthy of being called a right is that it is not translatable into a mere as-
signment of disvalue to its violation.
Thomas Nagel, Libertarianism Without Foundations, 85 YALE L.J. 136, 144 (1975) (book
review). Finnis makes a similar point. SeeJOHN FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES 47-51, 51
(1991) (concluding that "[t]he way one's options relate to the human goods at stake
in them is simply not captured by the model of a comparison of the human goods
embodied in alternative states of affairs"). The puzzle, of course, is that many think we
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Instead, we proceed just as I did in the loyalty example-we exclude
the reason to torture.
We should interpret Justice Mosk as asserting a similar reason-
exclusion. Justice Mosk, as we have seen, likened the use made of
Moore and his spleen to the violations of the body involved in torture,
slavery, indentured servitude, and debtor's prison. He saw the doctor
as violating Moore's bodily integrity by using him as a mine from
which they extracted "genetic ore." Given the weight Justice Mosk
placed on these analogies, we should interpret him as holding that
our commitment to the dignity and value of human beings excludes
the research reasons as reasons to deny the property right. Many do
value human beings and their bodies in such a way. Such an attitude
informs much of Margaret Radin's work, for example. 65
This completes our discussion of Moore. With this case as a tem-
plate, it should be possible to see incommensurability in a variety of
public-policy issues. Incommensurability arguably plays a role in, for
example, bankruptcy,66 contracts, 67 environmental law,68 free speech, 69
can "violate... a right if by doing so one could prevent more numerous or more
serious violations of the same right by others," provided the violations are very numer-
ous and very serious. How is this consistent with not regarding rights as "equivalent to
an assignment of a large disvalue to their violation" in the less serious cases? Nagel,
supra, at 144. We can put this puzzle to one side here.
6. Radin insists that:
We feel discomfort or even insult, and we fear degradation or even loss of the
value involved, when bodily integrity is conceived of as a fungible object.
Systematically conceiving of personal attributes as fungible objects is
threatening to personhood, because it detaches from the person that which is
integral to the person.
MargaretJane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1881 (1987).
6' See Donald R. Korobkin, Value and Rationality in Bankruptcy Decisionmaking, 33
WM. & MARY L. REv. 333, 341-42 (1992) (arguing that "[iun answering bankruptcy
questions... the court must resolve conflicts among... diverse values" that may not
be comparable on a "single scale").
67 See Richard Warner, Excluding Reasons: Impossible Comparisons and the Law, 15
OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 431, 451-53, 451 (1995) (arguing that a "workable comparison
of reasons" is not always possible in contract law).
6 See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562, 629-33, 630 (1992) (claiming that
"[c]omparative risk analysis [in environmental law] gives no guidance on how to make
moral judgments when confronted with ... conflicting types of risk").
69 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV.
779, 829-34, 830 (1994) (arguing that incommensurability issues arise in deciding both
"whether free speech values are unitary or instead plural and diverse" and "whether to
treat speech as an ordinary commodity").
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racial discrimination," sexual equality,7' and torts.7
V. DOES INCOMMENSURABLrYMATTER?-THIRD PASS
Even so, it does not yet follow that incommensurability is any se-
rious barrier to deciding by comparing reasons. Suppose that as a
society we, by and large, shared the same reason-excluding commit-
ments. Then we would agree, for the most part, on what reasons to
exclude and what reasons to compare, and public decisionmakers
simply could decide by comparing nonexcluded reasons. With little
disagreement over what to exclude, incommensurability would occa-
sion little controversy. The problem, of course, is that we do not
agree. John Rawls makes the point eloquently:
[L]ong historical experience suggests, and many plausible reflections
confirm, that... reasoned and uncoerced agreement is not to be ex-
pected .... Our individual and associative points of view, intellectual af-
finities and affective attachments, are too diverse, especially in a free
democratic society, to allow of lasting and reasoned agreement. Many
conceptions of the world can plausibly be constructed from different
standpoints. Diversity naturally arises from our limited powers and dis-
tinct perspectives; it is unrealistic to suppose that all our differences are
rooted solely in ignorance and perversity, or else in the rivalries that re-
sult from scarcity. [The appropriate view of social organization] takes
deep and unresolvable differences on matters of fundamental signifi-
cance as a permanent condition of human life.
7 3
Rawls is, of course, talking about disagreement generally, not specifi-
cally about disagreement over reason-excluding commitments, but
the point certainly applies to the latter sort of disagreement.
This is the sort of disagreement we saw in Moore and that we imag-
ined in the town budget example. In Moore, some will not-as pre-
sumably the majority did not-find Justice Mosk's analogies with
torture, indentured servitude, and so on, compelling. After all, just
how is the voluntary removal of a spleen like torture or indentured
servitude? And even those who find the analogies apt still may not
70 See id. at 828-29, 850-51 (suggesting that rights against racial discrimination are
not economically valuable).
7' See id. at 847-49, 848 (arguing that sexual equality will be achieved only when
women receive "the appropriate kind and not the appropriate level of valuation").
72 See Radin, supra note 65, at 1876-77, 1877 (evaluating the argument that tort
recovery ought not to be available for certain injuries because "human life activity, or
at least certain aspects of it, ought not to be traded, nor to be conceived of in market
rhetoric or evaluated in market methodology").
73 John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77J. PHIL. 515, 542 (1980).
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agree that "our society acknowledges a profound ethical imperative to
respect the human body as the physical and temporal expression of
the unique human persona," where this "ethical imperative" is inter-
preted as a reason-excluding commitment to human dignity.74 Fur-
ther, even those who do agree with this still may be convinced that we
must abandon this commitment in Moore, for they may be con-
vinced-as the majority was-that recognizing a property right for
Moore simply is unworkable, given the current state of medical re-
search. Such disagreement is inevitable. This is the town budget
dilemma with which we began. We imagined my making an impas-
sioned incommensurability-based plea for school funding. The
difficulty is that others have made conflicting cases, either incom-
mensurability-based or not. How is the council to decide in a legiti-
mate fashion unless it compares reasons? This is the argument we
put in the mouth of the town council majority earlier on. What is the
answer?
John Finnis offers a solution. In his discussion of incommensur-
ability, Finnis asks, "How are conflicts of rights to be resolved? That is
to say, how much interference with one person's enjoyment of his
'right', by other persons, in the exercise of the same right, and of
other rights, is to be permitted?"75 He answers that there is
no alternative but to hold in one's mind's eye some pattern, or range of
patterns, of human character, conduct, and interaction in community,
and then to choose such specification of rights as tends to favour that
pattern, or range of patterns. In other words, one needs some concep-
tion of the human good, of individual flourishing in a form (or range of
forms) of communal life that fosters rather than hinders such flourish-
. 76ing.
The first point to note is that this is to compare reasons for and
against various options by considering how well those options realize
"some pattern, or range of patterns, of human character, conduct,
and interaction in community."77 But, how else are we to decide, if
not in this way? Indeed, as we noted at the outset, this is a require-
ment of political legitimacy,7 for, to repeat Steve Burton's admoni-
71 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
75 FINNIS, supra note 23, at 219.
76 Id. at 219-20.
7 Id. at 219.
78 See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
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don, "[i]n a society that cares aboutjustice ... decision making based
on reason... not on preference or faith, is crucial for legitimacy."7
Of course, this comparison of reasons occurs after we have settled
on "some pattern, or range of patterns, of human character, conduct,
and interaction in community."'O How does a public decisionmaker
decide what pattern to endorse? Finnis notes that we "can adopt a set
of commitments that will bring the basic values into a relation with
each other sufficient to enable one to choose projects and, in some
cases, to undertake a cost-benefit analysis (or preference-maximizing
or other like analysis) with some prospect of a determinate 'best
solution.' 8 ' However, he emphasizes that "the adoption of a set of
commitments, by an individual or society, is nothing like carrying out a
calculus of commensurable goods.",
2
So, what is it like? Consider the town budget example. When I
make my incommensurability-based plea to fund the schools, I am
urging the council to adopt a commitment that would resolve the
issue of whether to fund the schools. If the council adopts my reason-
excluding commitment, it would vote to fund the schools and cut
funding to the police. Of course, political legitimacy would demand
that the council produce adequate reasons to explain to those ad-
versely affected why it has adopted this commitment. And, when the
council does not adopt my commitment, it owes me an analogous
explanation. Consider the initial version of the town budget exam-
ple, when the council responded to my incommensurability claim by
insisting on comparing reasons. The flaw in the council's response is
not in the insistence on comparison, but in the failure to explain
adequately why it refused to adopt my commitment.
But how is the council to provide such explanations? It is unlikely
that it can produce a relevant comparison of reasons to justify its
choice. As noted in the choice-of-career example, universal and
personal perspectives often provide an inefficient basis for ranking
reasons for competing commitments as better, worse, or equally
good.83 Public decisionmakers are in no better position. It is essential
to note, however, that this does not mean that rational discussion is
impossible. Raz is quite clear about this point: "Rational action is
action for (what the agent takes to be) an undefeated reason. It is
Burton, supra note 4, at 368.
FINNIS, supra note 23, at 219.
81 Id. at 115.
82 Id.
" See supra Part II.D.
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not necessarily action for a reason which defeats all others."
84 Accord-
ingly, the town council can reveal its action as rational by advancing
its reasons for adopting or rejecting the reason-excluding commit-
ment I propose. In doing so, it would not advance reasons to com-
pare them, but to explain, and perhaps to persuade, to change points
of view.
Some will disagree on the ground that rational choice is impossi-
ble in cases of incommensurability. William Lucy, for example, takes
it as obvious that "we cannot rationally choose between incommensu-
rable values.""' David Luban attributes essentially the same view to
Finnis:
Finnis appears to be arguing ... that if rational choice among goods is
possible, they must be commensurable. For though he does not state
this... point in so many words, he does offer the logically equivalent
claim that incommensurability of goods implies that rational choice
among them is impossible. Indeed, this claim is the central point of his
86
argument....
Lucy and Luban overlook a crucial distinction. An example
makes this plain. Suppose you are trying to choose between being a
dentist and being a lawyer. You have reasons for each choice, and let
us stipulate that the reasons are incommensurable: They cannot be
compared as better, worse, or equally good reasons for being a lawyer
or a dentist. Does this mean that you cannot "rationally choose"
between being a lawyer and being a dentist? The answer is "yes" and
"no." You certainly cannot have better reasons for choosing to be a
lawyer instead of a dentist. We have stipulated that the reasons are
not comparable in this way. So, if by "rational choice" we mean
"having better reasons for one choice over the other," then "rational
choice" is impossible. But there is another, equally good, sense of
"rational choice" that clearly is possible. You can choose to be a
lawyer for reasons; indeed, you can choose to be a lawyer for reasons
84 RAZ, supra note 1, at 339. A choice among incommensurable alternatives,
according to Raz, "may be based on a reason. Though the reason is incommensurate
with the reason for the alternative it shows the value of that option and when that
option is chosen it is chosen because of its value." Id. at 338.
85 William Lucy, Natural Law Now, 56 MOD. L. REV. 745, 757 (1993). Lucy mistak-
enly cites Raz as holding this view. See id. at 757 n.23. Raz does discuss "the inability of
reason to guide our action" in cases of incommensurability, but he is alluding to an
inability to compare adequately the reasons for choosing between alternatives, not the
inability to find reasons supporting any particular choice. RAZ, supra note 1, at 334.
86 David Luban, Incommensurable Values, Rational Choice, and Moral Absolutes, 38
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 65, 67-68 (1990) (commenting on Finnis, supra note 15, at 9-11).
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that are not defeated by, or inferior to, any other reasons you have.
Your choice to be a lawyer is backed by reasons and is in that sense
rational. It is in this sense that incommensurability is compatible with
rational decisionmaking
87
A vital and mature political discourse could promote rational de-
cisionmaking in this sense, perhaps even in a society as large and as
fragmented as the United States.a Ideally, the discourse would have
the result that those adversely affected by public policy, in principle,
could provide themselves with adequate reasons to accept the policies
that so affect them. Whether this is possible depends, of course, on a
variety of social and political factors."' The point to emphasize is that
these reflections require a reconsideration of the ideal with which we
began: Namely, that in forming public policy, we should select the
policy supported by the best reasons. We cannot interpret this to
require in all cases a comparison of reasons; where such comparison
is impossible, action can be based on undefeated reasons.
87 Finnis, pointing out that Luban misunderstands him, makes essentially the same
argument against Luban. SeeJohn Finnis, Concluding Reflections, 38 CLEv. ST. L. REV.
231, 236 (1990). Finnis argues that the
[c]hoice between incommensurable options is often rational in two ways:
(a) inasmuch as it opts for the chosen option for the reasons which make that
option rationally appealing (even though those grounds do not make that op-
tion unqualifiedly more appealing than alternative options); and (b) inas-
much as it conforms to all the requirements of practical reasonableness which
we call moral, e.g., fairness, consistency, exclusion of any choice to destroy,
damage or impede any basic human good, etc. Both (a) and (b) provide rich
grounds for rational criticism of choices.
Id. at 237-38.
Similarly, Sunstein overlooks this point in arguing that incommensurability makes
rational choice impossible, assuming that qualitative comparison is essential to ra-
tional choice. See Sunstein, supra note 69, at 808. This simply is not true, however, if
one distinguishes between having reasons for choosing an option and having reasons
that show that option to be better than other alternatives.
8s This fact makes the emptiness of much of present politics even more deplor-
able. Given the shallow state of modern discourse, claims of incommensurability may
be too subtle to be heard; in this sense, perhaps incommensurability really is, sadly, of
little practical import.
"' For some relevant theoretical points related to incommensurability, see Joseph
Raz, Mixing Values, 65 ARISTOTELIAN SOc'Y 83, 83 (Supp. 1991) (exploring "[u]nder
what conditions.., one [can] compare the strength or stringency of conflicting
reasons for and against an action where they are a function of irreducibly different
values"), and Joseph Raz, Moral Change and Social Relativism, SOC. PHIL. & POLlY,
Winter 1994, at 139, 140-41 (discussing the influences on morality and examining the
possibility and feasibility of moral change).
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Moore illustrates these themes.9 In his dissent, Justice Mosk as-
serts that the court should acknowledge that society has a reason-
excluding commitment to human dignity that requires recognizing a
property right for Moore. 9' When the council in the town council
example rejects my position, and when the Moore majority rejects
Justice Mosk's, these decisionmakers are obligated to explain their
rationale for not adopting the relevant reason-excluding commit-
ment. To see what is at issue here, consider that reason-excluding
commitments can, and often do, play a role in defining who we
are, in defining our individual identities. By analogy, the reason-
excluding commitments a society endorses can be said to define, in
part, its collective identity. To accept, arguendo, Justice Mosk's char-
acterization, do we wish to be a society that allows doctors to mine a
patient as if he or she were a mineral deposit? Even in Moore, the
judges-decisionmakers accustomed to considering delicate moral
and political questions-fail to understand and address the incom-
mensurability claim. In rejecting the incommensurability claim, the
majority effectively is claiming either that society does not really have
the reason-excluding commitment that Justice Mosk claims it has, or
that, although it does have such a commitment, it must, in the face of
developments in medical research, abandon or reinterpret that
commitment. Incommensurability inevitably casts public decision-
makers in the role of interpreters of society's commitments.
CONCLUSION
Political legitimacy demands a collective discussion of those con-
flicting reason-excluding commitments implicated in public-policy
choices. Therefore, since legitimacy matters, so do the incommen-
surability-creating commitments. Racial and sexual equality provide a
final example. In rectifying unjust discrimination based on race and
gender, affirmative action regards race and gender as reasons to
choose one person over another in employment. We also have a
conception of social equality that considers differences, such as race
and gender, irrelevant to access to employment; our conception of
social justice excludes race and gender as reasons. There is currently
considerable controversy over precisely this issue. Resolving this
controversy means interpreting our commitment to equality: Is it or
' Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493-94 (Cal. 1990); see also
supra notes 45-62 and accompanying text.
9' See id. at 516 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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is it not a commitment that excludes considerations of race and
gender in hiring decisions? This Article is a plea for self-conscious
attention to such questions.
* * * * * *
